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Abstract:  We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection
and study a generalized Rothschild and Stiglitz model where agents may differ with
respect to the accidental probability and their expenditure levels in case an accident occurs.
We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional
and unconditional dynamic contracts.  An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance
companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on
the occurrence of past accidents.  Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract
also depend on individual past performance (like in car insurances).  We investigate
whether allowing insurance companies to offer dynamic insurance contracts results in
Pareto-improvements over static contracts.  Our main results are as follows.  When agents
only differ in their accidental expenditures, then dynamic insurance contracts yield a
welfare improvement only if dynamic contracts are conditional on past performance.
When, however, agents’ expenditures differ just a little bit dynamic insurance contracts are
strictly Pareto improving even for unconditional dynamic contracts.
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21. Introduction
Adverse selection is potentially a serious problem in any type of insurance market (see,
e.g. the seminal paper by Akerlof (1970)).1  If agents have different risks and if insurance
companies are not able or are not allowed to distinguish between different risk categories,
“low-risk” agents may find the insurance premium too costly and will not fully insure
themselves, or in the extreme, will not take insurance at all.  This mechanism of adverse
selection generally leads to welfare losses, as potential benefits from trade are not fully
realized by the market participants.  One way to overcome the adverse selection problem in
insurance markets is through screening (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976): insurance
companies offer a variety of insurance contracts, each with a different premium and
coverage, and agents select the insurance contract that they like best.  By employing
screening mechanisms, the market is able to re-gain part of the welfare loss due to
asymmetric information.  Screening equilibria in competitive insurance markets may not
exist, however, and there is still a welfare loss associated with them (see Riley, 2001, for
an overview of the literature).2
Even though the probability of an accident is a recurrent one in most insurance
markets (with life insurance as an exception), the typical model of insurance markets
considers a static environment where agents incur a loss only once.  This modeling
assumption may be justified if we want to explain the behavior of insurance companies as
quite a few insurance contracts are essentially static (with car insurance as a notable
exception): the terms of the insurance contract are independent of the time period and past
history.  In this paper, we ask a normative question, namely whether Pareto-improvements
can be achieved if some kind of dynamic insurance would be provided.
We consider two types of dynamic insurance contracts.  The first type, which we call
conditional dynamic contracts, allows insurance conditions in future periods to depend on
an agent’s accidental history.  In such contracts, agents that from an ex ante point of view
take identical contracts may view different insurance terms in later periods when their
accidental history differs.  The second type of dynamic contract is unconditional, as an
insurer is not able or not allowed to use an agent’s past accidental history.  Unconditional
contract can still have a dynamic nature as the terms of the contract may depend on the
time period.
                                                
1
 A recent empirical confirmation can be found in Oosterbeek et al. (2001).
2
 For alternative equilibrium definitions see the papers by Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979).
3We consider these two types of dynamic contracts for the following reasons.
Conditional dynamic contracts are observed in the car insurance market with the infamous
bonus/malus rules.  It is important to understand the welfare implications of such contracts.
We do not know of markets where unconditional dynamic contracts are offered, but they
may be considered in markets where conditional contracts are politically not viable, like in
some health insurance markets.  In such markets it may be considered unfair if someone
has to pay a very high premium because she simply had bad luck and got many health
accidents in a row.  In some of these markets (e.g., the Dutch market for dental insurance;
see Oosterbeek et.al., 2001) there is a clear indication of adverse selection and one may
wonder whether unconditional dynamic contracts may help to overcome (partially) the
adverse selection problem and improve welfare.
The model we consider is a generalized version of the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1976) world, where insurance contracts last for some finite number of periods.   Agents
discount future utility and profit levels at a given discount rate. There are two types of risk-
averse agents: low-risk and high-risk.  The probability that an accident happens to an
individual is constant and the same in every time period.  This means that we abstract from
moral hazard issues.  Low-risk agents have lower accidental probability than high-risk
agents and their expenditures in case of an accident are also not higher (and in most cases
lower).  Although the formal model treats these expenditures as certain numbers, we like to
think of them in terms of expected values so that insurance companies cannot discriminate
between the two types of agents on the basis of the differences in expenditures.
Unconditional dynamic contracts only condition the terms of the insurance on the time
period.  Conditional dynamic contracts can, in addition, condition the terms of the contract
on the accidental history.
Apart from allowing insurance companies to change the terms of the insurance
contract over time, a dynamic analysis may introduce also other complications.  In
particular, agents may shift wealth from one period to another: insurance companies may
shift profits between different time periods so that competition doesn’t need to result in
zero profits in every time period, and consumers may save or borrow.  In the main body of
the paper we abstract from these complications and concentrate only on the effect of
dynamic contracts on welfare.  We do this by considering competitive Nash equilibria in
which insurance companies offer a set of dynamic contracts such that each type of agent
chooses an optimal contract from this set and no insurance company can unilaterally
benefit by adding contracts to this set.  We analyze the properties of these equilibria in
4three different settings: a "static" setting where insurance companies offer the same terms
of the contract in every period, and the two dynamic settings.
We have several results.  First, in all three settings, competitive Nash equilibria only
exist for a relatively small fraction of low-risk agents in the population.  Generally
speaking, competitive Nash equilibria with unconditional dynamic contracts exist for
larger fractions of low-risk agents than those equilibria with "static" contracts.  Existence
conditions in the other settings cannot be easily compared.  Second, high-risk agents get
full insurance, in all the equilibria in all three settings.  Third, when they do exist,
equilibria under conditional dynamic contracts yield a Pareto-improvement over static
equilibrium contracts and the optimal contract charges lower premiums to agents with
better accidental histories.  The main reason is that the probability of having a better
accidental history is larger for low-risk agents than for high-risk agents allowing insurance
companies to screen the two types of agents more easily.  For a certain class of utility
functions when the number of periods gets large, the welfare achieved through conditional
dynamic contracts approaches first-best welfare levels even if agents discount the future.
Fourth, unconditional dynamic contracts only provide a welfare improvement over static
contracts when low-risk agents have lower expenditures than high-risk agents.  When this
is so, optimal unconditional contracts have some periods without insurance and much
better insurance conditions in the remaining periods.  As expenditures differ, high-risk
agents are hurt more in periods without insurance than low-risk agents.  This allows
unconditional dynamic contracts to better screen the different types of agents.  Finally, by
means of simulations we show that the welfare improvements of using dynamic insurance
contracts can be considerable.  Depending on the context and on the parameter values,
dynamic contracts can reduce the welfare loss for low-risk agents between the first-best
solution and the static equilibrium outcome by more than 60%.
The paper is related to different branches of literature (apart from the seminal paper by
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).  First, the paper is closely related to the literature on the use
of experience ratings in multi-period self-selection models, see, e.g., Dionne and Laserre
(1985) and Cooper and Hayes (1987).  The idea in this literature is that the terms of future
coverage may depend on previous loss experience as, for example, in car insurances.  This
is the setting we study when considering conditional dynamic contracts.  Dionne and
Laserre (1985) study infinite horizon contracts where agents maximize average per period
utility.  They show that in such a world, insurance companies can screen agents in such a
way that the first-best outcome is achieved.  Cooper and Hayes (1987) study a similar
5problem in a two-period model.  Their main focus is on the differences in equilibrium
outcomes under monopoly and perfect competition.  Our main focus in this paper is
different.  We want to understand why and under what conditions dynamic contracts are
welfare improving vis-à-vis static contracts: is it because of the state-dependent nature of
conditional contracts or is it because of the time (and not state) dependency that is also
present in unconditional contracts.  In so far as our paper deals with conditional dynamic
contracts we analyze the intermediate case of finite horizon contracts where, in addition,
agents discount future utility.  We show that contrary to what is argued by Cooper and
Hayes (1987) in order to get close to the first-best, it is not necessary that agents do not
discount future payoffs.  Moreover, by means of simulations we provide insight in the
question by how much welfare can be improved.
Part of the insurance literature studies the way probationary periods can be used to
separate agents with different risk profiles (see, e.g., Eeckhoudt et al. (1988) and Fluet
(1992) among others).  The basic idea of a probationary period is that prior to the
reimbursement of losses incurred, the insurance company pays no indemnity.  A
probationary period is one of the possibilities in our framework and we show that the
optimal unconditional contract has a probationary period.  The literature on probationary
periods considers, however, a situation where agents incur only one loss over a certain time
period where the timing of the loss may be different for different types of agents.  This
situation is relevant in life insurance markets.  In contrast, our model considers situations
in which in any given period, agents have a certain probability of getting an accident
independent of previous accidents.  Hence, our model does not cover life insurance
markets, but is more relevant in situations where agents may incur many losses at different
moments in time.
Finally, there is a series of articles (Janssen and Roy 1999a, 1999b, Janssen and
Karamychev, 2000) showing that through dynamic trading the competitive market
mechanism allows high quality sellers of a durable good to trade even in the presence of
asymmetric information.  Dynamic equilibria typically involve increasing prices over time
and higher quality sellers waiting to sell in later periods.  In other words, waiting time
before selling can act as a screening device in dynamic competitive markets with adverse
selection.  Our analysis in the context of unconditional dynamic contracts has a similar
flavor: low-risk agents (i.e., "high quality" agents) incur an initial loss of not being insured
in order to get much better insurance conditions later on.
6The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses definitions and
notations that we will use in the rest of the paper.  Section 3 briefly analyzes the static
model for reference purposes.  Sections 4 and 5 consider the analysis of the dynamic world
of conditional and unconditional contracts respectively.  Section 6 concludes with a
discussion of the results.  Some of the more elaborate proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. Preliminaries
The environment studied here is a generalization of the model first described by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976).  Individual agents come in two types, high-risk agents "H" and low-
risk agents "L".  Everyone is endowed with some income level in every period, which is
normalized to be equal to 1.  Each type { }LHi ,∈  is characterized by a level of (expected)
expenditure ie  in case of an accident, where 10 <≤< HL ee , and a probability of an
accident iq , 10 <≤< HL qq .
3
  The probability of an accident and the related expenditures
are private knowledge and constant through time.  All agents are risk averse, they have the
same state independent strictly concave and increasing utility function u and for the sake of
convenience we assume that ( ) 01 =u .  Let ( )1,0∈α  denote the share of low-risk agents
within the population.
On the supply side of the market there are a number of risk neutral insurance
companies competing with each other.  These companies are not able to discriminate
between the different types.  In what follows we will use the superscripts “S” and “D” to
refer to static and dynamic variables, respectively, and we will compare the welfare
implications of two types of insurance contracts: static and dynamic.  A static insurance
contract ( )SSS DP ,=Θ  consists of a constant premium SP  and a constant deductible SD
such that in case of an accident an insured individual receives { }0,max Si De −  from the
insurance company.  By ( )∞=Θ ,00S  we denote an artificial contract, which gives no
insurance at all.  The expected utility of type i  under contract SΘ  is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SiSSiSSi PuqDPuqU −−+−−≡Θ 111 .
                                                
3
 Although formally, we treat the level of expenditures to be fixed numbers, we do not allow insurance
companies to offer insurance contracts that are able to discriminate between different types only because of
the differences in fixed expenditures.  For example, we do not allow to condition future terms of an insurance
contract on observed expenditure levels.  One way to think of these expenditure levels is, therefore, as
expected values so that differences in types cannot be based on different realizations of expenditure levels.
7A dynamic contract DΘ  lasts T time periods and consists of T parts, each part
specifying the terms of the contract in that time period.  Unlike a static contract, dynamic
contracts may offer different insurance conditions for an agent in time periods Tt ,,2=
depending on her previous accidental history th .  Thus, a dynamic contract’s term in time
period t  is a set of 12 −t  insurance policies that correspond to every tt Hh ∈ , where tH  is a
set of all possible history realizations up to period t.  For example, in period 1 a dynamic
contract DΘ  offers a simple static insurance policy ( )111 , DP=Θ , in period 2 a (static)
policy ( ) ( ) ( )( )121212 , DP=Θ  applies if there was an accident and ( ) ( ) ( )( )020202 , DP=Θ  applies if
there was no accident.  Hence, ( ) ( ){ }12022 ,ΘΘ=Θ .  In a similar fashion
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1,130,131,030,033 ,,, ΘΘΘΘ=Θ  and so on.  We will call such a contract
( )TD ΘΘΘ=Θ ,,, 21  .
The ex ante expected utility of type i under a contract DΘ  is
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )∑ ∑
= ∈
−




−−+−−
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t Hh
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1 111Prδ ,
and her expected per period utility is
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where ( )1,0∈δ  is the common discount factor and ( )ti hPr  is an i  agent’s probability to end
up with a history th  at time period t.  For example, for ( )0,1,04 =h , i.e., no accidents in
time periods 1 and 3 and an accident in time period 2, ( ) ( )24 1Pr iii qqh −= .
One can see that for a dynamic contract with constant insurance conditions, i.e., for
( ) *Θ=Θ tht , ( ) ( )*Θ=Θ SiDDi UU .  This allows us to make welfare comparisons between static
and dynamic contracts.
As explained in the introduction, in certain cases an insurer is not able, or not allowed,
to use the information, which is obviously available to him, about an agent’s past accidents.
In this case the contract terms tΘ  are no longer sets of policies but simply a sequence of
static contracts ( )ttt DP ,=Θ  and the expression for the expected per period utility
simplifies to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }∑
=
−
−
−
−−+−−=Θ
T
t
titti
tDD
i PuqDPuqU T
1
1
1
1 111δδδ .
8We will call such a contract an unconditional dynamic contract.  The difference between
these contracts and the conditional dynamic contracts described above is that unconditional
contracts make the terms of the insurance contract in period t unconditional on the
accidental history.
Let DTΣ  be the set of all T-period dynamic (conditional or unconditional, depending on
the context) insurance contracts.  Then, the set SΣ , which is the set of all static insurance
contracts, coincides with D1Σ  and, therefore, any static contract 
SΘ  can be treated as a
1-period dynamic contract.  What we will do then in this paper is to describe welfare
properties and existence conditions of a competitive Nash equilibrium over the set DTΣ  for
an arbitrary but fixed 1≥T .
All insurance companies offer T-periods insurance contracts to the agents.  Because of
competition insurance companies do not make any profit in equilibrium.  Every agent
chooses the contract, possibly S0Θ , that maximizes her expected per period utility.  The
formal definition of a (competitive Nash) equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 1.  A T-period competitive Nash equilibrium is a subset of T-period insurance
contracts, DTT Σ⊂Ψ , present in the market satisfying the following conditions:
a) Each agent chooses an insurance contract that maximizes her per period utility, i.e.,
every type { }LHi ,∈  chooses the contract ( )Θ∈Θ
Ψ∈Θ ii
U
T
maxarg .
b) Any equilibrium contract is bought by at least one type, i.e., for any TΨ∈Θ′
{ }LHi ,∈∃  such that iΘ=Θ′ .
c) Any equilibrium contract yields nonnegative profit to an insurer.
d) No insurance company can benefit by unilaterally offering a different insurance
contract, i.e., any insurance company offering a contract T
D
T ΨΣ∈Θ′ \  such that for
some { }LHi ,∈  ( ) ( )Θ>Θ′
Ψ∈Θ ii
UU
T
max  makes strictly negative profit.
Standard arguments rule out any pooling insurance contract PΘ  to be a Nash
equilibrium.  For static contracts, the argument is given by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
In a dynamic world a similar argument holds true: for any (partial) pooling contract there
exists a contract that differs from it in only one time period in such a way that only low-
9risk agents prefer the latter contract.  This implies that the deviation yields strictly positive
profit.
On the other hand, a separating Nash equilibrium (static or dynamic), which involves
two contracts HΘ  and LΘ , may not exist if there exists a profitable pooling contract PΘ
that gives a higher utility level to the low-risk agent than LΘ .  Hence, the existence of a
separating Nash equilibrium is guaranteed if any pooling contract yielding nonnegative
profit, PΘ , gives less utility to low-risk type agents than LΘ , i.e., ( ) ( )LLPL UU Θ≤Θ .
Throughout the following three sections we assume that an insurance company is
forced to price its contract in such a way that it yields zero profit in every time period and
that agents are also not allowed to transfer wealth between periods.
3. Static Insurance Contracts
In this section we start off by briefly generalizing the standard results of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) to the case where types of agents differ not only in accidental probabilities
but also in their expenditures in case of an accident.  Equilibria under static contracts,
which are considered here, are a benchmark for further analysis.
A competitive Nash equilibrium, if it exists, involves two contracts SHΘ  and SLΘ  such
that they generate zero profit for the insurer.  This implies that ( )SHHHSH DeqP −=  and
( )SLLLSL DeqP −= .  Moreover, it follows that high-risk agents take full insurance, i.e.,
( ) ( )0,, HHSHSHSH eqDP ==Θ .  Low-risk agents get at most partial insurance according to the
contract SLΘ .  This contract is such that high-risk agents are either indifferent between SHΘ
and SLΘ , i.e., ( ) ( )SLSHSHSH UU Θ=Θ , or strictly prefer SHΘ .  Partial, or even no insurance, is the
price low-risk agents have to pay in order to be separated from high-risk agents.  Existence
of equilibrium is guaranteed only, as is well known, for relatively small values of α .  The
following proposition formally states this standard result.
Proposition 1. Let ( )( )HHqSL equme H −−= 11 1  where m is the inverse of the utility function
u.  Then, there exists an ( )1,0∈Sα  such that:
a) For all ( )Sαα ,0∈  there exists a unique separating competitive Nash equilibrium
{ }SLSH ΘΘ=Ψ ,1 .  High-risk agents get full insurance ( ) ( )0,, HHSHSHSH eqDP ==Θ  while
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low-risk agents get partial insurance, i.e., ( )SLSLSL DP ,=Θ  and ( )LSL eD ,0∈ , if ∈Le
( HSL ee , ] and no insurance, i.e., SSL 0Θ=Θ , if ∈Le [ SLe,0 ].
b) For all ( )1,Sαα ∈  a separating competitive Nash equilibrium 1Ψ  does not exist.
Proof.  The utility low-risk agents get under SLΘ  does not depend on α , i.e., ( )SLSLU Θ  is a
constant determined by the incentives compatibility constraint ( ) ( )SLSHSHSH UU Θ≥Θ .  Given
( )SLLS DeqP −= , ( )SSHU Θ  becomes a decreasing function of ∈SD [ Le,0 ]:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .01111
111
<−′−−−−′−−=
=−−+−−=Θ
S
HL
SS
LH
S
H
SS
HS
SS
HS
PuqqDPuqq
PuqDPuq
dD
dU
dD
d
It takes its minimum value of ( )LH euq −1  at LS eD = .  Hence, if
( ) ( ) ( )LHHHSHSH euqequU −≤−≡Θ 11  then any competitive contract providing partial
insurance to the low-risk agents is more attractive for the high-risk agents than ( )SHSHU Θ
and, therefore, SSL 0Θ=Θ .  This happens if ( )( ) SLHHqL eequme H ≡−−≤ 11 1 .  If, on the other
hand, SLL ee >  then the incentives compatibility constraint becomes binding that determines
( )LSL eD ,0∈  in such a way that ( ) ( )SLSHSHSH UU Θ=Θ .
While ( )SLSLU Θ  is independent on α  the maximum utility low-risk agents may ever
obtain from a competitive pooling contract SPΘ , i.e., ( ) ( )SPSLSPSL UU S
P
Θ=Θ
Θ
maxˆ , does depend
on α  as the "pooling price" SPP , which is defined to be equal to
( ) ( ) ( )SPHHSPLLSP DeqDeqP −−+−= αα 1 , depends on it.  Solving the maximization
problem
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )SPHHSPLLSP
S
PL
S
P
S
PL
DeqDeqP
PuqDPuq
−−+−=
−−+−−
αα 1:s.t.
111max
yields the first order condition
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )SPSPHL HLSPSPSPLL DPuqq
qqDDPu
q
q
ˆˆ1
11
1
ˆˆˆ1
1
−
′
−+−
−+
=−−′
− αα
αα
,
which implicitly defines SPDˆ .  Now, the first order derivative of ( )SPSLU Θˆ  with respect to α
becomes
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )SPLLSPHHSPLSPSPLSPSLSPSL DeqDeqPuqDPuqUddU ˆˆˆ11ˆˆ1
ˆˆ
−−−−′−+−−′=
∂
Θ∂
=
Θ
αα
.
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One may easily see that ( ) 0ˆ >ΘSPSLdd Uα  for all HSP eD ≤≤ ˆ0 .  Finally, note that
( ) ( ) ( )
10
ˆˆ
==
Θ<Θ<Θ
αα
S
P
S
L
S
L
S
L
S
P
S
L UUU .  This implies that there exists a unique ( )1,0∈Sα  such
that ( ) ( )
S
S
P
S
L
S
L
S
L UU
αα =
Θ=Θ ˆ  and the result follows.
Figure 1 presents the main idea.  It shows that there is no insurance for low-risk agents
if their expenditures are relatively small.  In the figure { }HΘ  and { }LΘ  are the sets of
competitive contracts designated for high- and low-risk agents respectively.  These
contracts satisfy the zero-profit conditions ( )DeqP HH −=  and ( )DeqP LL −= ,
respectively.  Point A denotes the optimal contract for high-risk agents.
One may see that if the set of competitive contracts that can be offered to low-risk
agents only lies entirely below the indifference curve that passes through point A, as
depicted in Figure 1, i.e., when SLL ee ≤ , then any contract from the set { }LΘ  is more
attractive for high-risk agents than SHΘ .  Even the worst contract B, which gives zero
coverage, i.e., when LeD = , gives a higher utility level to high-risk agents than 
S
HΘ .
Hence, in the separating equilibrium there is no insurance for low-risk agents and we are in
a case of pure adverse selection.  If, on the other hand, SLL ee > , such that the set { }′ΘL
denoted by the dashed line intersects with the indifference curve that passes through point
A, then in equilibrium the low-risk agents get a contract C which gives partial insurance.
Since the model described here involves four parameters, namely Hq , He , Lq  and Le ,
for presentational purposes in what follows we fix Lq  and He  at arbitrary levels and
consider the parameter space ( ) =LH eq , [ 1,Lq )x[ He,0 ].  For any fixed level of Lq  and He ,
Figure 1.  Separating static insurance contracts.
D
P
0 Le He
HH eq
LLeq
S
Le
A
B
C
( ) ( )SHSHSH UconstU Θ==Θ
{ }LΘ { }HΘ { }′ΘL
12
S
Le  can be written as a strictly increasing function of Hq , ( ) ( )( )HHqHSL equmqe H −−= 11 1 ,
and ( ) HSL ee =1 .
To get an idea about the relative importance of dynamic insurance contract, we have
done several simulations.  In the context of static insurance contracts, the following
example shows for a particular choice of utility functions the region of the parameter
values where low-risk agents are partially insured.
Example 1.  In order to get an idea of the range of parameter values that yields partial
insurance to the low-risk agents we calculated ( )HSL qe  for 9.0=He  and 1.0=Lq .
Figure 2 shows the functions ( )HSL qe  for two different utility functions:
( ) mmu ln1 =  and ( ) 12 −= mmu .  Below the curves, the expenditure of low-risk
agents is too low to give them any insurance in equilibrium. //
4. Conditional Dynamic Contracts
We next study the properties and existence conditions of competitive Nash equilibria in a
setting where insurance companies can offer conditional dynamic contracts.  As explained
in the Introduction, insurance conditions in this case may depend on the time period and on
the accidental history of insured agents, as is the case with car insurances.  Although
insurance companies are not allowed to transfer profits between different periods, they
0
0,1
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0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Figure 2.  Regions of parameter values where low-risk agents do and do not get
positive insurance.
Hq
Le
( ) muqe HSL ln, =
( ) 1, −= muqe HSL
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may "transfer profits" from one accidental history to another, i.e., competition between
insurance companies results in a zero-profit condition of the form
( ) ( )( ) 0Pr =−−∑
∈ tt
tt
Hh
h
tLL
h
tti DeqPh , Tt ,,1= .
This means that even though insurance companies know that only a certain type i of
agents may decide to take a certain insurance contract, they may nevertheless find it
optimal to distinguish between agents who (by pure chance) have a different accidental
history.  As we will see, they may do so in order to better screen high and low-risk agents.
The proposition below states the main result for conditional dynamic contracts.
Wherever competitive Nash equilibria in this setting exist, they yield a Pareto-
improvement over the static equilibrium contracts: high-risk agents also get full insurance
in every period independent of their accidental history and low-risk agents get (at most)
partial insurance in every period and the insurance premium they pay is lower, the better
their accidental history.  These equilibria exist wherever the fraction is small enough so
that no company wants to deviate by offering a pooling contract.  Finally, when the utility
level associated with very low income levels falls dramatically, formally when
( ) −∞=
→

P 0
 , then when the time horizon is very large, it is possible to offer lower-risk
agents almost full insurance even if the fraction of low-risk agents is high.
Proposition 2.  For any T there exists an ( ) ( )1,0∈TDCα  such that
a) For all ( )DCαα ,0∈  there exist a separating competitive Nash equilibrium
{ }DLDHT ΘΘ=Ψ , .  The contract DHΘ  is unique and coincides with SHΘ , DLΘ  generally
need not to be unique but all multiple contracts DLΘ  yield the same utility.
b) For all ( )1,DCαα∈  a separating competitive Nash equilibrium TΨ  does not exist.
c) If { }DCS ααα ,min<  then ( ) ( )SLSLDLDL UU Θ>Θ .
d) For any given time period t, if low-risk agents get positive insurance then the optimal
premium and deductible given a history of k accidents, k tLP ,  and 
k
tLD , , satisfy the
following relation: 1
,
1
,,
−− += k tL
k
tL
k
tL DPP .
e) If ( ) −∞=
→

P 0
  then ( ) 1lim =
→∞
TDCT α  and for any fixed ( )1,0∈α
( ) ( )equU LDLDLT −=Θ∞→ 1lim .
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The proof of Proposition 2 is in the appendix.  The result can be understood along the
following lines.  For any difference between 
/
  and 
+
 , it is more likely that high-risk
agents get an accident than low-risk agents do.  Accordingly, the terms of the insurance
contract after a few accidents gets a relatively smaller weight in the overall evaluation of
the insurance contract by a low-risk agent than by a high-risk agent.  Hence, it is possible
to design a dynamic contract that low-risk agents prefer to the best static contract insurance
companies can offer, while high-risk agents still prefer the full insurance contract.  Those
contracts give worse insurance conditions to agents that (just by chance) have had many
accidents (see property (d)).  In expected terms, as the probability of an accident is
constant over time, insurance companies make losses over those agents with better
accidental histories, while they gain (in expected terms) on those agents with worse
histories.
Even though low-risk agents get a higher utility in the separating equilibrium under
conditional dynamic contracts than under static contracts, it is not guaranteed that this type
of equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameter values of α.  The reason is that low-
risk agents also get a higher utility under possible conditional dynamic pooling contracts
than under possible static pooling contracts.
Finally, the result that when the number of periods is large, low-risk agents can get a
conditional dynamic contract that gives them a utility level almost equal to the utility of
full insurance, is based on the following considerations.  For any 1>  there exist a
contract DLΘˆ  with full insurance at a premium //  in all periods 11 −=   , and full
insurance at a relatively high premium +P  if the history was one with only accidents and a
relatively lower premium −P  otherwise in the last period.  The premiums +P  and −P  at
time period T are constructed such that the zero-profit condition holds as well as the
incentive compatibility constraint, i.e., high-risk agents prefer to take the full insurance
contract at a premium HH eq  in all periods.  The proof shows that when T becomes large,
−P  approaches 
//
 , while +P  approaches 1, the full income level, in such a way that,
because of the difference between 
/
  and 
+
 , the expected utility of this event for the
low-risk agent approaches 0, while it remains sufficiently negative for high-risk agents.  As
contract DLΘˆ  need not be the equilibrium contract, expected utility under the equilibrium
contract is even higher.  Note that the result does not depend on agents not discounting
future utility.
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It is important to understand the role of commitment on the part of the insurance
companies.  If they had not been committed to the contract, a company after one or more
periods could have offered better insurance conditions to those low-risk agents that had
been unlucky enough to get many accidents, e.g., they could have offered to start almost
the same contract from the beginning (as if there had been no bad accidental history) and
made a profit as high-risk agents had not been attracted at that moment.  However, if high-
risk agents anticipate this behavior on the part of the insurance companies, then they would
not opt for the full insurance contract designed for them.
In this model, we have implicitly assumed that insurance companies and agents are
committed to the contracts they have signed and that if an agent switches to another
insurance company she will not start the contract from the beginning.  In some markets,
like the one for car insurance, commitment on the part of insurance companies is achieved
as insurance companies share information about accidental history of their clients.  It is
more difficult, however, to ensure that agents are committed to the contract.
If this form of commitment is not achievable, additional constraints have to be
imposed, namely after every history contract terms should be such that it is not possible to
design a profitable contract that agents prefer to continuing the existing contract.
Moreover, after every history we have to ensure that agents would like to stay insured
instead of quitting the insurance market altogether.  In a T-period world, it is very difficult
to satisfy all those constraints.4  This is another reason why we consider unconditional
contracts in the next section.
Before we do so, we provide an estimate of the welfare improvements that are
possible for certain specific cases.
Example 1 continued.  To determine by how much welfare could be improved by
conditional dynamic insurance contracts, we normalize the total low-risk welfare
loss due to asymmetric information to be 100% so that the static contract SLΘ  gets
a score of 0% and full insurance under the full information gets a score of 100%.
We then calculate the ratio ( ) ( )( ) ( )SLSLLL
S
L
S
L
D
L
D
L
Uequ
UU
Θ−−
Θ−Θ
1
ˆ
 for fixed 9.0=He , 1.0=Lq  and
different values of ∈Hq [ 1,Lq ) and ∈Le [ He,0 ], where SLΘ  is the static
                                                
4
 See Cooper and Hayes (1987) for some of the relevant considerations when T = 2.
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equilibrium contract and DLΘˆ  is the contract mentioned above. The contract DLΘˆ
is chosen, as is it difficult to calculate the equilibrium contract DLΘ  itself.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show parameter regions, which yield different levels
of the welfare gain for low-risk agents for ( ) mmu ln= , 9.0=δ  and 4=T  and
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Figure 3. Welfare improvements under conditional contracts '
/
ˆ , eH=0.9, qL=0.1,
u(m)=ln m, T=4.
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Figure 4. Welfare improvements under conditional contracts '
/
ˆ , eH=0.9, qL=0.1,
u(m)=ln m, T=5.
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5=T  correspondingly.  For larger values of T almost all parameter combinations
lead to almost 100% welfare improvement.
As the equilibrium conditional dynamic contract DLΘ  gives an even higher
utility level for the low-risk type agents than DLΘˆ , the potential welfare
improvement and the region where it is possible is even larger than presented. //
5. Unconditional Dynamic Contracts
In the introduction we have explained that in certain markets, like health insurance
markets, conditional dynamic contracts may be considered unfair or politically not viable.
When, after a sequence of many accidents, car insurance becomes too expensive, a person
may always decide not to drive a car anymore.  This is not true for health insurance.  For
this reason we consider in this section whether unconditional dynamic contracts may
recoup part of the welfare loss due to adverse selection in the static equilibrium outcome.
Another advantage of unconditional contracts is that the commitment problem can be
easily avoided here.
It is clear from the outset that wherever they both exist, unconditional contracts yield
lower welfare than conditional contracts as the latter include the former.  What is not clear
from the outset, however, is whether the equilibrium existence conditions are stricter for
the case of unconditional contracts.  This is because the best unconditional pooling contract
for low-risk agents also yields lower utility than the best pooling contract in the ease of
conditional contracts.  We start the analysis by considering the Rothschild-Stiglitz case in
which 
+/
 = .  In this case, we have a straightforward negative result, which is that the
best unconditional contract is the repeated static contract.  In other words, welfare gains are
not possible using unconditional dynamic contracts in such a world.
Proposition 3.  If 
+/
==  then for all ( )Sαα ,0∈  there exists a unique separating
competitive Nash equilibrium that has the static insurance policies SHΘ  and SLΘ  in any time
period.  For all ( )1,Sαα ∈  a separating competitive Nash equilibrium does not exist.
Proof.  We first show that ( ) ( )6
+
6
++7+
'
+


 =≡ 1 .  Maximizing
( ) ( )∑
=
−
−
−
=
7
W +W
6
+
W'
+
'
+

7 1
1
1
1

 with respect to all ∈
+W


[0,e] and subject to zero profit
condition ( )HtHHt DeqP ,, −=  yields 0, =HtD  and eqP HHt =,  for all Tt ,,1= , hence,
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S
HHt Θ=Θ ,  and ( ) ( )6+6+'+'+  = .  On the other hand, maximizing
( ) ( )∑
=
−
−
− Θ=Θ T
t Lt
S
L
tD
L
D
L UU T 1 ,
1
1
1 δδδ  with respect to all ∈+/  [0,e] and subject to
( )LtLLt DeqP ,, −=  and the incentive compatibility constraint ( ) ( )6+6+'/'+  ≤  yields the
following Lagrangian:
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ),111
111
1 ,,,
1
1
1
1 ,,,
1
1
1
∑
∑
=
−
−
−
=
−
−
−
−−+−−−Θ+
+−−+−−=
T
t LtHLtLtH
tS
H
S
H
T
t LtLLtLtL
t
PuqDPuqU
PuqDPuqL
T
T
δλ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
,
and the first order conditions for Tt ,,1=  are:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )LtLHLtLtLHLtLtLtLL PuqqDPuqqPuDPuqq ,,,,,, 1111111 −′−−−−′−=−′−−−′− λ .
It immediately follows that the constraint is binding and the first order conditions become:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LtLtHLLtLtLH
LtLLLtLtLL D
PuqqDPuqq
PuqqDPuqq
,
,,,
,,,
1111
1111 ϕλ ≡
−′−−−−′−
−′−−−−′−
= , Tt ,,1= .
As ( ) 0
,
>′ LtDϕ  for all 0, ≥LtD , all LtD ,  have to be equal to each other, i.e., LLt DD ,1, =  for
all t and, therefore, DLΘ  is just a repetition of a static contract.  But we know that the best
contract for the low-risk type is SLΘ .  Finally, SLΘ  exists if and only if ( )Sαα ,0∈ .
It is interesting to better understand the reason for this result.  A first reason is that we
require the zero-profit condition to hold in every period.  This together with the fact that
the utility function is time-separable yields a set of first-order conditions, which are the
same for every period.  The second reason is the concavity of the utility function, which
makes sure that less-risky outcomes with the same expected expenditures are preferred to
more risky outcomes.
This result also sheds another light on the positive result obtained for conditional
dynamic contracts.  There are two important differences between the two settings when
+/
 = .  First, with conditional contracts insurance companies are able to shift profits
between different accidental histories for every given time period.  Second, even if
expected profits are zero after every history, insurance companies may give agents with
better histories contracts with more insurance (lower deductible and higher premium).  In
these two ways insurance companies are able to relax the static incentives compatibility
constraint from the perspective of the low-risk agents.  As the insurance company is risk-
neutral, it is indifferent between (i) a contract giving constant insurance conditions with
zero expected profit in each state, (ii) a contract making zero expected profits in each state
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(at different terms) or (iii) a contract making zero expected profits in every period (but not
in every state).  To the contrary, the low-risk agents make a distinction between these
cases.
Another point in the above intuitive explanation of Proposition 3 is that we have not
considered corner solutions of type 
/W
=

 where no insurance is offered in certain
periods.  In the case where HL ee =  this is also not really necessary as both types of agents
have the same evaluation (utility) of no insurance: )1()1( LH eueu −=− .  When HL ee < ,
this is no longer the case and we may use "no insurance in certain periods" (a probationary
period) as a way to screen agents in order to reach welfare improvements.  The next
proposition summarizes our results for this case.
Proposition 4.  There exists an ∈Dα [ 1,Sα ) and ( )HDL ee ,0∈  such that:
a) For all ( )Dαα ,0∈  there exists a *T  such that for all *TT >  there exists a separating
competitive Nash equilibrium { }DLDHT ΘΘ=Ψ , .  High-risk agents get full insurance,
i.e., ( )SHSHDH ΘΘ=Θ ,, .  The low-risk agents get a contract DLΘ  such that
( )

∈=Θ=Θ
∈Θ=Θ
=Θ
sepTLLL
D
tL
sep
SD
tLD
tL NNtDP
Nt
\for  ,,
for  ,
,
0,
,
,
where sepN  is the separation phase of the contract.  If ∈
D
Le [ HDL ee , ] then ∅=sepN ,
S
LL DD =  and SLL PP = , i.e., low-risk agents get static insurance ( )SLSLDL ΘΘ=Θ ,, .  If,
on the other hand, ( )DLDL ee ,0∈  then ∅≠sepN , SLL DD <≤0  and SLL PP > .  In this case
( ) ( )SLDLDLDL UU Θ>Θ .
b) For any ( )1,Dαα ∈  a separating competitive Nash equilibrium does not exist.
c) For all ( )1,LH qq ∈  ( ) ( )( )HHSLHDL eqeqe ,∈  and ( ) ( ) HHDLqLDL eqeqe H == →1lim .
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix.  Proposition 4 tells us that the results of
Proposition 3 are robust only in a (possibly small) neighborhood of ,HL ee =  i.e., when Le
is close enough to He .  When Le  falls outside this neighborhood, i.e., when DLL ee < , then
a Pareto-improvement is possible vis-à-vis the static outcome.  The best screening contract
for low-risk agents involves a "separation phase" with no insurance and an "insurance
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phase" with better (and constant) insurance conditions than in the static contract.5  The
range of fractions of low-risk agents in the population for which such a separating
equilibrium exists is also larger than in the case of a static separating equilibrium.  Finally,
we are able to show that the neighborhood around He  for which no welfare improvements
vis-à-vis the static equilibrium are possible becomes very small when Hq  is close to Lq  or
close to 1 (part (c) of Proposition 4).
In order to better understand the reason for the "large T assumption", we have to
explain a part of the more formal proof given in the Appendix.  In the proof we write the
overall utility level low-risk agents get as a convex combination of the utility in the
separation and the insurance phase.  The weights are expressed in terms of the discount
factor , the number of insurance periods T and the set of time periods in the separation
phase 
VHS
	 .  We show that in order to have a welfare improving contracts that satisfies the
incentive compatibility constraint this weight has to be in a certain interval.  As T is a finite
number, the weights can only take on a finite number of values.  For any relatively small
value of T, it may happen that by none of the possible choices for the length of the
separation phase the weight of utility function falls in the required interval.  When T is
large enough but still finite, this is no longer the case.  In summary, the requirement that T
be large enough has to do with the assumption that time is measured discretely, rather than
that we need the contract to last for a very long period of time.
We next show by means of an example for which region of parameter values welfare
can be improved and by how much it can be improved.
Example 1 continued.  Example 1 showed parameter regions where low-risk agents
will (not) have some insurance contract under the static equilibrium.  Figure 5
shows the functions ( )HDL qe  for the same two utility functions as studied in
Example 1 for the limit case when ∞→T  and 21≥δ .  For all the parameter
values below the graph dynamic contracts allow for welfare improvements.
Parameter values above the graph are such that the dynamic and static
equilibrium contracts coincide, hence welfare improvement is not possible.  One
                                                
5
  We implicitly assume that low-risk agents have to register with an insurance company even though they
don’t get any insurance in the initial separation phase, i.e., before they are able to get to the good insurance
phase they already have to be known to the insurance company.  At the same time, they can not buy an
insurance from another company.  This is possible when insurance companies share information, a practice
that is common, for example, in the car insurance market.
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can see that for the given utility functions the regions where welfare
improvements are possible are quite large.  In particular, DLe  is quite close to He .
To determine by how much welfare could be improved by dynamic
insurance contracts, we follow the same procedure as in the example of Section 4.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show parameter regions, which yield different levels of the
welfare gain for low-risk agents, for ( ) mmu ln=  and ( ) 1−= mmu ,
respectively.
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Figure 5. Region of parameter values where welfare can be improved using
unconditional dynamic contracts.
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Figure 6.  Welfare improvements under unconditional contract '
/
, eH=0.9, qL=0.1,
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One can see that if SLL ee <  and low-risk type gets no insurance in a static
equilibrium, then the welfare improvement dynamic insurance yields is very
sensitive to Hq  while if 
S
LL ee >  then the difference LH ee −  plays a crucial role. //
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we studied a generalization of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model of a
competitive insurance market affected by adverse selection.  We allowed agents to have
different expenditures and investigated the nature of dynamic contracts.  We showed that
in the multi-period dynamic model a competitive Nash equilibrium exists as long as the
share of low-risk agents is sufficiently small.  If such an equilibrium exists, it is Pareto-
superior to the static equilibrium if conditional contracts are allowed.
When contracts are unconditional, welfare improvements are only possible if
expenditures of the two groups are different.  If this is so, these equilibria exist for a larger
fraction of low-risk agents than static equilibria.  The optimal contract has a separation
phase offering no insurance and insurance phase offering much better insurance conditions.
Both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts have been derived under the
assumption that they yield zero profit in every period and that agents are not allowed to
shift wealth between periods.  Here we discuss at a more informal level how these
assumptions can be relaxed.
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Figure 7. Welfare improvements under unconditional contract '
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We begin with the discussion of unconditional contracts.  It is not difficult to see that
as before high-risk agents will get a purely static full insurance contract in equilibrium.
The equilibrium low-risk contract cannot be obtained explicitly, however.  What can easily
be shown is that an optimal contract that is Pareto-superior to the static equilibrium
contract exists.  When the static equilibrium contract gives no insurance to low-risk agents,
i.e., ( )HSLL qee ≤ , then, like in the basic model, an insurer is able to separate the types by
offering a dynamic contract with a sufficiently long separation phase.  Indeed, when the
length of the separating phase increases the incentive compatibility constraint can be easily
satisfied.  On the other hand, as the dynamic contract is not worse than the static contract
S
LΘ  during the whole term and is strictly better in the insurance phase, the contract is
Pareto-superior as well.
Hence, the set of Pareto-superior separating contracts is not empty and the equilibrium
dynamic contract is the one that maximizes the utility of low-risk agents.  The existence of
such a contract is guaranteed by the continuity of both the objective function and the
incentive compatibility constraint and by the compactness of the feasible parameter set.
Therefore, for all parameter combinations, which lie below the curve ( )HSLL qee =  in
Figure 2, Pareto improvement by means of dynamic insurance is always possible.  In the
example below we calculate the highest low-risk expenditure DLeˆ  such that the welfare
improvement is possible in the whole interval ( )SLeˆ,0 .  Thus, the difference between DLeˆ
and DLe  reflects the sensitivity of the model with respect to savings.
Example 1 continued.  Apart from the functions ( )HDL qe  that were already presented
in Figure 2 for two specific utility functions, Figure 8 presents functions ( )HDL qeˆ
for the same example.  For all the model’s parameters below the graphs ( )HDL qeˆ
dynamic contracts allow welfare improvements to be made.
The figure shows that savings do not change the outcome significantly and
just change the set of parameters allowing for welfare improvement a little bit. //
Given this result for unconditional contracts, we will be brief about conditional
contracts.  As dynamic conditional contracts yield weakly higher utility for the low-risk
agents the region of possible welfare improvement is even wider.  But, again, the pooling
low-risk utility maximizing conditional dynamic contract provides higher utility than the
24
static pooling contracts.  Hence, it is not guaranteed that this type of equilibrium exists for
a wider range of parameter values of α.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.  We begin by deriving a set of competitive contracts { }DLDH ΘΘ ,
satisfying the incentives compatibility constraints and maximizing ( )DLDLU Θ .  Then we
derive a competitive pooling contract tP,ˆΘ  maximizing the low-risk utility.  Finally, we
show that there exist an ( )1,0∈DCα  such that for all DCαα <  ( DCαα > ) tP,ˆΘ  gives a lower
(higher) utility for the low-risk type than DLΘ .
Contract ( )THHDH ,1, ,, ΘΘ=Θ   with { }
tt
t
Hh
h
tHtH ∈
Θ=Θ
,,
 and ( )ttt h tHh tHh tH DP ,,, ,=Θ ,
maximizes ( )DDHU Θ , which is
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑
=
∈
− 



Θ
−
−
=Θ T
t
Hh
h
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S
HtH
t
T
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H
tt
tUhU
1
1 Pr
1
1 δδ
δ
,
subject to zero profit constraints
( ) ( )( ) 0Pr =−−∑
∈ tt
tt
Hh
h
tHH
h
ttH DeqPh , Tt ,,1= .
The Lagrange function and the first order conditions for the interior solution are:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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∑ ∑
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.
Solving them together with zero profit conditions yields 0
,
=
th
tHD  and HH
h
tH eqP t =,  for all t
and th , in other words, high-risk agents always get full insurance in a separating
equilibrium, ( )SHSHDH ΘΘ=Θ ,, .  This solution is unique due to the global concavity of the
objective function and we do not need to look at corner solutions with some Sht t 0Θ=Θ .
Contract ( )TLLDL ,1, ,, ΘΘ=Θ   with { }
tt
t
Hh
h
tLtL ∈
Θ=Θ
,,
 and ( )ttt h tLhtLh tL DP ,,, ,=Θ , maximizes
( )DDLU Θ , which is
27
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑
=
∈
− 



Θ
−
−
=Θ T
t
Hh
h
t
S
LtL
t
T
DD
L
tt
tUhU
1
1 Pr
1
1 δδ
δ
,
subject to zero profit condition ( ) ( )( ) 0Pr =−−∑
∈ tt
tt
Hh
h
tLL
h
ttL DeqPh , Tt ,,1=  and
incentives compatibility constraint ( ) ( ) ( )HHDHDHDDH equUU −=Θ≤Θ 1 .
The Lagrange function for this problem is
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The first order conditions for an interior solution are:
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which can be rewritten as follows
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.
Then, it follows that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, otherwise it would
have been 0=µ , 0
,
=
th
tLD  for all t and th , and finally, LL
h
tL eqP t =,  that yields
( ) ( )DHDHDLDH UU Θ>Θ , a contradiction.  Hence, 0, >th tLD  for all t and th .
One may note here that all thtLP ,  and t
h
tLD ,  depend only on ( )ti hPr  but not on th  itself.
Hence, if, for instance, 4=t  then ( )1,0,04 =′h  and ( )0,1,04 =′′h  correspond to different states
of the world but ( ) ( ) ( )424 Pr1Pr hqqh iiii ′′=−=′  and, therefore, 44 4,4, hLhL PP ′′′ =  and 44 4,4, hLhL DD ′′′ = ,
that allows us to change notations: by kht =ˆ  we will denote all states of the world where
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there were exactly k accidents in time periods from 1 up to 1−t .  Then it follows that
( ) ( ) 11 1Pr −−− −= ktikikti qqCk , where ( )( )!1 !1!1 − −−− = t ktkktC  are binomial coefficients.  Plugging it into
the above system yields
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Getting rid of tλ  and µ  leads to
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Both equations can be written as
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Dividing the second equation by the first one we obtain 1
,
1
,,
−− += k tL
k
tL
k
tL DPP , which together
with the zero profit condition yields
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that defines k tLP ,  (hence, thtLP , ) in terms of k tLD , .  The profit an insurer gets at time t from a
low-risk agent with a history k is
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hence, 0
,
1
,,
1
, tL
k
tL
k
tL
t
tL ππππ >>>>>
−−  .  Therefore, in accordance with the zero profit
condition ( ) 0Pr1
1 ,
=∑ −
=
t
k
k
tLL k π , 0
1
,
>−t tLπ  and 0
0
,
<tLπ , in other words, an insurer makes
losses over those agents with better accidental histories, while they gain (in expected
terms) on those agents with worse histories.
It might happen that the solution ( )TLLDL ,1, ,, ΘΘ=Θ   is just a local but not global
maximum.  Hence, we may have to find all corner solutions imposing Sh tLt 0, Θ=Θ  for some
set of states of the world tt HH ⊂
0
.  The Lagrange function in this case becomes
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Consequently, the only difference from the previous analysis here is that the first order
conditions will involve the summation over the subset 0\ ttt HHh ∈  instead of the whole set
tt Hh ∈ .  Having been calculated for all tt HH ⊂
0
 a contract DLΘ  is chosen in such a way
that, first, it satisfies L
h
tL eD t <,  for all 
0\ ttt HHh ∈ , and, second, it maximizes ( )DLDLU Θ .
Thus, we have described a set of competitive contracts { }DLDH ΘΘ ,  satisfying the
incentive compatibility constraint and maximizing ( )DLDLU Θ .  This set becomes a
competitive Nash equilibrium if no competitive pooling contract gives a higher utility level
for the low-risk agents.  We will prove that for small enough values of  this is the case.
The utility low-risk agents get under DLΘ  does not depend on  while the utility they
get under a pooling contract ( )TPPDP ,1, , ΘΘ=Θ   with { }
tt
t
Hh
h
tPtP ∈
Θ=Θ
,,
 and
( )ttt h tPh tPh tP DP ,,, ,=Θ  depends on it.  As the low-risk agents’ utility
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is time-separable as well as the zero profit conditions, which are
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maximization of ( )DPDLU Θ  over [ ]Lh tP eD t ,0, ∈  splits into T parts:
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and it has a unique solution due to the global concavity of the objective function and linear
constraints.  The Lagrange function and the first order conditions are:
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Solving them yields
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One may see that
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hence ( ) ( )ttt htPh tPhtP PuDPu ,,, ˆ1ˆˆ1 −′>−−′  and, therefore, 0ˆ , >th tPD .
If such an interior solution has L
h
tP eD t >,  then we have to look at the corner solutions,
where Sh tPt 0,ˆ Θ=Θ  for some set of states of the world tt HH ⊂0 .  In this case the Lagrange
function becomes:
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hence, the first order conditions remain the same but now only for 0\ ttt HHh ∈ .  Solving
them for tP,ˆΘ  for all tt HH ⊂0  and taking one that maximizes ( )DPDLU Θ  gives us needed
contract.
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The contract conditions, hence, ( )DPDLU Θˆ , now become functions of .  Taking the first
order derivative and using the envelope theorem and zero profit conditions in a form
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In other words, an insurer gets a positive profit from the low-risk type and a negative profit
from the high-risk type.  Therefore, ( ) 0ˆ >ΘDPDLdd Uα  as 0>tλ .
Now, we will show that ( ) ( ) ( ) 10 ˆˆ == Θ<Θ<Θ αα DPDLDLDLDPDL UUU  and, therefore, there
exists an ( )1,0∈DCα  such that ( ) ( )DLDLDPDL UU DC Θ=Θ =ααˆ  and the results (a) and (b) of the
proposition follow.
If 1=α  then DPΘˆ  gives always the full insurance that leads to the first best outcome
( ) ( )LLDPDL equU −=Θ = 1ˆ 1α , hence, ( ) ( )DLDLDPDL UU Θ>Θ =1ˆ α .  What we will show is that
( ) ( )'
/
'
/
'
3
'
/
 ˆ >
=0 .  To this end we construct a competitive contract DLΘ
~
 such that
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆ~ =Θ>Θ≥Θ αDPDLDLDLDLDL UUU .  Obviously, ( ) ( )''/'/'/  ≥  for any competitive
contract '  by the construction of '
/
.
As an example of such a contract DLΘ
~
 we take a contract that coincides with DPΘˆ  for
all t and th  except one, i.e., we put tt
h
tP
h
tL ,,
ˆ
~ Θ=Θ  for all t and *hht ≠ , and 


ˆ
 K
W3
K
W/
≠ .  In this
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state of the world *h  a policy 
*
,
~ h
tLΘ  can offer a much better insurance for the low-risk type
than 
*
,
ˆ
h
tPΘ  which is calculated for the whole population that consists of high-risk agents
only.  The following Figure A.1 represents the arguments.  The downward-sloping line is a
set of policies in the state *h  making the whole contract '
3
ˆ
 competitive.  One point on the
line is the contract 
*
,
ˆ
h
tPΘ  that maximizes ( )'3'/  and, therefore, ( )*htSLU Θ .  Two curves
represent high- and low-type indifference curves where the latter is tangent to the set { }*
,
h
tPΘ
at 
*
,
ˆ
h
tPΘ .  The set of contracts { }*htΘ  satisfying zero profit condition for the low-risk type is
denoted by the dotted line.  This set lies below the former set as all the profit obtained in
all the other time periods and states is transferred here.
One may easily verify that the contract DLΘ
~
 can be chosen as any point from the set
{ }*
,
h
tLΘ  that lies between the low- and high-risk indifference curve.  Hence,
( ) ( ) 0ˆ =Θ>Θ αDPDLDLDL UU .
Part (c) of the proposition is trivial as the contract ( )SLSLD ΘΘ=Θ ,  was available
during the optimization procedure of searching DLΘ , hence, ( ) ( )6/6/'/'/  ≥ , and the
contract ( )SLSLD ΘΘ=Θ ,  does not satisfies the first order conditions for DLΘ , those are
1
,
1
,,
−− += k tL
k
tL
k
tL DPP , therefore, ( ) ( )SLSLDLDL UU Θ>Θ  unless those first order conditions
degenerate in a global corner solution ( )SSDL 00 , ΘΘ=Θ  .
 
Figure A.1.
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h
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Finally, in order to prove that ( ) 1lim =
→∞
TDCT α  we will show that for any T there exists a
contract DLΘˆ  satisfying both zero profit and the incentive compatibility constraints an such
that ( ) ( )LLDLDLT equU −=Θ∞→ 1ˆlim .  As ( ) ( )DLDLDLDL UU Θ≥Θ ˆ , ( ) ( )LLDLDLT equU −=Θ→∞ 1lim  holds as
well.  Then, as ( ) ( )LLDPDL equU −<Θ 1ˆ  for any 1< , this implies that ( ) 1lim =
→∞
TDCT α .
Let us consider a contract ( )
7//
'
/ 
ˆˆˆ 1= , where ( )0ˆ  //N W/ =  for all
11 −=   , ( ) ( )0ˆˆˆ

−
=≡  N
7
N
7
N
7/
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Together with (A.1) this equation defines unique values of LLeqP <−  and LLeqP >+ .  To
see this we plug the (A.1) into the last equation:
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The left hand side, being a function of +P  has the following properties:
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Hence, +P  and −  are uniquely defined.  Now we take limits
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that ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.  As we have already established in Proposition 3, the dynamic
contract maximizing the low-risk type utility and providing strictly positive insurance for
every period coincides with the static equilibrium contract SLΘ .
Now we will search for the best dynamic contract, which gives no insurance in a
separation phase Tsep NN ⊆ , which is a subset of all time periods { }TjT jN 1== , and strictly
positive insurance in an insurance phase sepT NN \ .  The same arguments as in the proof of
Proposition 3 leads to the insurance conditions in the insurance phase are constant, i.e.,
( )DPDt ,=Θ=Θ  for sepT NNt \∈ .  Hence,
( ) ( ) ( )? 6
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,
which can be rewritten as
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 0 Θ+Θ−=Θ SLSSLDDL wUUwU
where 
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

≡ ∑∑
TsepT Nt
t
NNt
tw δδ  denotes the relative weight of the insurance phase of the
whole dynamic contract.  In this notations a dynamic contract DΘ  is defined by LP , LD
and Dw .
Obviously, DLΘ  must have such LP , LD  and Dw  that maximize ( )DDLU Θ  subject to
zero profit condition ( )DeqP LL −=  and the incentives compatibility constraint
( ) ( )SHSHDDH UU Θ≤Θ .  We will look for such contracts that are also Pareto-superior to SLΘ ,
i.e., ( ) ( )SLSLDDL UU Θ≥Θ .  Those two constraints can be rewritten as follows:
( ) ( )
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0
.
Now we will consider the cases ( )HSLL qee ≤  and ( )HSLL qee >  separately.
d) If ( )HSLL qee ≤ , then ( ) ( )SSLSLSL UU 0Θ=Θ  and, therefore, ( ) 0=Dw  while
( ) ( ) 00 >Θ−Θ SSHSHSH UU  and, therefore, ( ) 0>Dw , for all ( )LeD ,0∈ .  Hence, any
dynamic contract with ( )( ) ( )1,0,0 ⊂∈ Dww  is strictly Pareto-superior to SLΘ .
e) If ( )HSLL qee >  then there exists a static contract SLΘ  with LSL eD <  and both ( )Dw  and
( )Dw  are strictly increasing functions as ( ) 0<Θ
dD
dU Si
, LHi ,=  for ∈D [ SLD,0 ].  For
all ∈ [ 6
/
0 ) they belong to the range ( )1,0  and ( ) ( ) 1== SLSL DwDw .  Hence, if there
exists a ∈ [ 6
/
0 ) such that ( ) ( )DwDw <  then any dynamic contract with
( )www ,∈  is strictly Pareto-superior to the static contract SLΘ .
What we will show now is that the continuous function ( )DF  being defined as
( ) ( ) ( )DwDwDF −≡  is always negative over ∈D [ SLD,0 ) if Le  exceeds a certain
threshold level DLe , i.e., if DLL ee ≥ , and is strictly positive in some left neighborhood
( ) ( )SLSL DDDD ,0, ⊂∈  otherwise.  To this end, using the implicit definition of SLD ,
which is
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SHSHSLSLHSLSLSLHSLSH UDPuqDDPuqU Θ=−−+−−≡Θ 111 , (A.2)
we first rewrite ( )DF  as ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 FFDwDwDF ⋅=−= , where
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As 01 >F  over ∈D [ SLD,0 ], we have to show that the function ( )DF2  has the same
properties we require of the function ( )DF .
Firstly, as ( ) ( )SHSHSLSH UU Θ=Θ , it follows that ( ) 02 =SLDF .  Then, the first and
second order derivatives of ( )DF2  are
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As all the three terms in the above expression are negative, 02 <
″F .
Summarizing, 2F  is strictly concave over ∈D [ SLD,0 ] and ( ) 02 =SLDF .  Then it
immediately follows that if ( ) 02 ≥′ SLDF  then ( ) 02 <DF  for all SLDD < , and ( ) 02 >DF
in some neighborhood ( )⊂∈ SLDDD , [ SLD,0 ] otherwise.  Therefore, we have to
investigate the sign of ( )SLDF ′2 , which now becomes a function of the model
parameters and, in particular, a function of Le , i.e., ( ) ( )SLL DFeF ′≡ 23 .
Firstly, we note from (A.3) that ( ) 03 >HeF .  Indeed,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ).1111                           
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Now, using the mean-value theorem we can write for some ( )SLSL DPex −−−∈ 1,1  and
( )1,1 SLPy −∈ :
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Plugging them into the last expression for ( )HeF3  we finally obtain
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 01113 >−−′′−−′′−−−= SLSLSLSLLLLHH DPuyuPuxuDeqqqqeF ,
as ( ) ( ) 01 >−−′>′ SLSL DPuxu  and ( ) ( ) 01 >′>−′ yuPu SL .
On the other hand, ( ) 03 <SLeF .  Indeed, in this case ( ) SLSLSL eeD = , ( ) 0=SLSL eP  and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0111113 <−−−−′−′−= HSLSLLHLSL eueueuuqqqeF .
Hence, continuous function ( )HeF3  takes the opposite signed values at the ends of the
interval [ HSL ee , ].
Secondly, differentiating (A.2) w.r.t. Le  yields
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and, consequently, as ( )SLLLSL DeqP −= , ( ) ( ) 011 >−′′=−′
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allows us to write the derivative ′3F  as follows:
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As the sum of the first four terms in the above expression is strictly positive we get:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.0
111
1111
11
11111
2
3
>
−−
′
−
′
−−
′
−+
+−′−′−−−′−=
−−
′
−
′
−−
−−′−′−−−−′−>′
S
L
S
L
S
LLLHL
L
S
L
S
L
S
LHL
S
L
S
L
S
LLHL
L
S
LHL
S
L
S
LLHL
DPuPueuqqq
euPuDPuqq
DPuPuqqq
euPuqqDPuqqqF
38
Hence, the function ( )LeF3  has a unique null in the interval ( )HSL ee , , which we denote
as DLe , i.e., ( ) 03 =DLeF .  By construction of DLe , for all ( )DLSLL eee ,∈  there exists an
interval ( ) ( )SLSL DDD ,0, ⊂  such that for all ( )SLDDD ,∈  ( ) ( ) 10 <<< DwDw  and,
therefore, any dynamic contract with ( )www ,∈  is strictly Pareto-superior to SLΘ .  If,
on the other hand, ( )HDLL eee ,∈  then ( ) ( )DwDw >  for all ( )SLDD ,0∈  and there is no
dynamic contract which is Pareto-superior to SLΘ , that ends the case.
Hence, if and only if DLL ee <  then the set of D and w that generate Pareto-superior
contracts is not empty.  Obviously, an insurer is able to choose D arbitrarily.  As for w, it
may only take discrete values:
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
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.
When ∞→T  this set gets an accumulation point 1=w , in other words, the number of
elements in any left neighborhood of 1=w  increases unboundedly when T becomes larger.
This property allows an insurer to choose D sufficiently close but still smaller than SLD  and
find such a w that ( ) ( )( ) ( )  ∈ .  Therefore, for all T sufficiently large the
set of strictly Pareto-superior contracts is not empty and its closure, the set of weakly
Pareto-superior contracts, contains a welfare-maximizing contract DLΘ .
Now we will show that ( ) ( ) HHDLqLDL eqeqe H == →1lim .  As for any Hq
( ) ( )( )HLSLLDL eqeqe ,∈  and the function ( )LSL qe  is continuous and ( ) HHSL eqe = , it follows that
( ) HHDLq eqeH =→1lim .  If, on the other hand, LH qq =  then
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 01111122 <−−′−−′−−−−=′
==
S
L
S
L
S
LHL
qqq
S
L DPuPueueuqqDF
LH
for any Le , so ( ) HLDL eqe = .
Finally, we define Dα .  As DLΘ  is the welfare maximizing dynamic contract, a
competitive separating Nash equilibrium exists as long as ( ) ( )αDPDLDL UU ≥Θ , where ( )αDPU
is the highest possible low-risk type utility under a pooling insurance contract.  Similar
argument to those in the beginning of the proof show that this pooling contract is purely
static, i.e., SP
D
tP DD =,  and ( ) ( ) ( )SPHHSPLLSPDtP DeqDeqPP −−+−== αα 1, .  Then, that highest
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utility level ( ) ( )DPDLDP UU Θ≡α  either is smaller than ( )SSLU 0Θ  and there exists no
competitive pooling contract that is better than S0Θ  for the low-risk type, or it is an
increasing function of α .6  Together with ( ) ( )DLDLDP UU Θ<0  and ( ) ( )DLDLDP UU Θ>1  this
implies that there exists a unique Dα  such that ( ) ( )( )τα DLDLDDP UU Θ> .  The fact that
SD αα >  follows from ( ) ( )SLSLDLDL UU Θ>Θ .
                                                
6
 See proof of Proposition 1.
